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Understanding Combinatorial Clock Auctions

Funding agency: Oesterreiches Nationalbank Jubiläumfonds

Project number: 15994

Amount: Euro 100'000

Project duration: 2014 - 2017

Project team: Maarten Janssen, Bernhard Kasberger


Short description:
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate spectrum for mobile telecom licenses.  The optimal bidding behaviour in CCAs has, however, only been (partially) analyzed in a simple context where bidders only care about the package they themselves win and in what they have to pay for it.

Over the last year several papers have emerged that point at several weaknesses of CCAs. In this research project, we want to better understand the weaknesses of the design, the potential damaging outcomes the auction may lead to and how the auction design can be adapted to accommodate these weaknesses. In particular, we would like to consider the implications of incentives to raise rivals’ cost, bidding under a budget constraint and valuations depending on auction outcomes. The project will use game theoretic analyses and simulation techniques.

Department of Economics
University of Vienna

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