Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
- Author(s)
- Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck
- Abstract
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- University of Surrey
- Journal
- Theoretical Economics
- Volume
- 16
- Pages
- 1055-1093
- No. of pages
- 39
- ISSN
- 1933-6837
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3967
- Publication date
- 2020
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502047 Economic theory
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/strict-pure-strategy-nash-equilibria-in-large-finiteplayer-games(b6953b1f-7d85-4308-ba09-4bbc43c2bd1e).html