ANNUAL REPORT 2016
Department of Economics

Reporting period: January 01 – December 31, 2016

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FOREWORD

As winter term has come to an end, we are reminded of how much activity happened in 2016. This report summarizes the highlights of that year from our department’s perspective.

We continue to be highly international and diverse both in terms of the composition of our faculty and student body and in our academic orientation. This is reflected among other things in our recent hires, the places where those who left went to, and also in the long list of guests from Austria and abroad that our department hosted. At the same time we remain connected and rooted in the local community.

We welcomed **Eeva Mauring** who joined us on a 6-years assistant professorship. Eeva holds a PhD from University College, London. She is a microeconomic theorist by training and strengthens our faculty’s expertise in applying search theory to different markets. **Juha Tolvanen** also joined us as assistant professor. He received his PhD from Princeton University. Juha is a specialist in applied micro economics who works on both theoretical and empirical information economics with special interests in insurance markets and models of bargaining and elections. **Alejandro Cunat**, an internationally renowned expert in international trade, growth and development could finally join our department as a full faculty member; we welcomed him as our new “old” colleague. Isabelle Zimmer joined our support staff in November. We are extremely glad to have her.

During the course of the year, we had to say farewell to Theresa Grafeneder-Weissteiner, Melis Kartal, Joshua Sherman, Mariya Teteryatnikova, Kunibert Raffer and Elizabeth King. Melis and Mariya moved on to the Vienna University of Economics and Business where they continue to do research. Joshua Sherman now is a senior economist in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University, USA. Theresa decided that family matters more to her than academics, at least for now. Kunibert Raffer and Elizabeth King retired. On behalf of my colleagues I thank all of them for their service and contributions to our department. We wish them success and happiness.

In the fall of 2016, our department hosted a series of workshops which brought to Vienna many leading experts in the respective field. Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger had organized a workshop on Auctions and Market Design, and Jean-Robert Tyran together with Rupert Sausgruber (WU) led a small workshop on Behavioral Public Economics.
Our emeriti Manfred Nermuth and Peter Rosner had organized the event “Joseph Schumpeter heute” which included presentations and discussions centered around Schumpeter’s original ideas on monetary theory, the origins of economic growth and their implications for modern economics.

In terms of research, we continue to be ambitious and very busy. This is reflected in the regular research seminar series we host as well as in the many seminars and conference participations of our faculty. It is also reflected in the steady flow of publications under the co-authorship of our faculty some of which appeared in leading international journals including the European Economic Review, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the Rand Journal of Economics.

Innovations in our teaching program are currently under way. Together with colleagues from the faculty of philosophy at the University of Vienna, we are preparing the launch of an interdisciplinary Master’s program in Philosophy and Economics.

All of us are dedicated to keep up the high quality of our research and teaching in order to help make the world a better place.

Monika Gehrig-Merz
Professor and Head of Department
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Personnel
- 24 full-time faculty of which 9 full professors, 2 associate professors and 13 assistant professors
- 7 full-time administrative staff
- about two dozen external lecturers, tutors and teaching assistants (all part time)

Fields of research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition policy</th>
<th>History of Economic Thought &amp; Philosophy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econometrics</td>
<td>Imitation &amp; Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics &amp; Psychology</td>
<td>Industrial Organization</td>
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<td>Economics &amp; Sociology</td>
<td>Information Economics</td>
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<td>Economic Theory &amp; Mathematical</td>
<td>International Economics</td>
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<td>Environmental Economics</td>
<td>Labor Economics</td>
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<td>Experimental Economics</td>
<td>Macroeconomics</td>
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<td>Financial Economics</td>
<td>Microeconomics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Game Theory &amp; Applications</td>
<td>Pricing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth &amp; Development</td>
<td>Public Economics &amp; Political Economy</td>
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</table>

Research and publications

Our research is documented in 11 working papers and 17 journal articles, many of which appeared in high-profile journals such as Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, or Economic Journal.

Dissemination of research and exchange of ideas

The Department had more than 100 academic visitors over the year and our faculty made a similar number of trips to visit researchers in other departments and to present their research at conferences and workshops. We organized two regular research seminars in which 42 speakers presented their research. We also hosted four workshops and one conference (with an additional 36 invited speakers).

We are eager to disseminate our research to the public by regularly contributing to public debates, giving interviews and public speeches. For example, our faculty expressed their expert opinions in 8 contributions to the media.

Teaching

Our faculty has taught many classes at all levels. Beyond servicing our own curriculum, they actively participate in and support the curricula of neighboring disciplines, e.g. business, international business, or geography. They also teach economics as a minor to students from many other fields.
Administration and Services to the profession

Faculty members have contributed much of their time and effort to administration of the Department, the faculty and other (internal and external) institutions. We have extensively served as referees, editors and the like to promote the scientific discourse.
**ORGANIZATION, FACULTY AND STAFF**

**Organization (until September 30, 2016)**

Head of Department: Wieland Müller  
Deputy Head of department: Monika Gehrig-Merz  
Deputy Director of studies: Konrad Podczeck  
Deputy Director of graduate studies: Maarten Janssen

**Incoming faculty**

**Eeva Mauring** holds a PhD from University College London and joined us as assistant professor in October 2016. Her main research interests are in Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Imitation & Learning, Information Economics and Microeconomics.

**Juha Tolvanen** holds a PhD from Princeton University and joined us as assistant professor in October. His main research interests are in Microeconomics, Information Economics and Industrial Economics.

**Leaving faculty**

**Theresa Grafeneder-Weissteiner** was employed as assistant professor from October 2010 until February 2016. Her main interest is in Macroeconomics and Demographics.

**Melis Kartal** was employed as assistant professor at our Department from September 2012 until August 2016. Her main interests are in Political Economy, Behavioral Economics and Experimental Economics. She moved as assistant professor to the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

**Kunibert Raffer** was employed as associate professor of International Economics at our Department from January 1975. He retired in September 2016.

**Joshua Sherman** was employed as assistant professor from September 2011 until June 2016. His main interests are in Microeconomics and Pricing. He moved as senior economist to the Department of Economics at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.

**Mariya Teteryatnikova** was employed as assistant professor from October 2009 until April 2016. Her main interests are in IO, Game Theory, and Networks. She moved as researcher to the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

**Elizabeth King** was employed as secretary at our department from January 2001 until June 2016. She retired in July this year.
List of Fulltime Faculty (research interests indicated, alphabetically)

Ana-Begona Ania-Martinez, associate professor
Experimental Economics, Financial Economics, Game Theory & Applications, Imitation & Learning, Information Economics, Microeconomics

Alejandro Cunat, professor

Daniel Garcia, assistant professor
Game Theory & Applications, Industrial Organization, Information Economics

Monika Gehrig-Merz, professor
Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, Financial Economics

Marc Goni-Trafach, assistant professor
Labor Economics, Public Economics & Political Economy, Economic History

Maarten Janssen, professor
Competition Policy, Economics & Sociology, Game Theory & Applications, Industrial Organization, Information Economics, Microeconomics, Pricing

Robert Kunst, professor
Econometrics, Macroeconomics

Francesco Lancia, assistant professor
Growth & Development, Macroeconomics, Public Economics & Political Economy

Eeva Mauring, assistant professor
Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Imitation & Learning, Information Economics, Microeconomics

Iacopo Morchio, assistant professor
Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

Wieland Müller, professor
Competition Policy, Economics & Psychology, Experimental Economics, Game Theory & Applications, Industrial Organization, Microeconomics

Paul Pichler, assistant professor
Macroeconomics, Optimal Policy, Monetary-fiscal Policy interactions, Determination and Sustainability of Government debt

Konrad Podczeck, associate professor
Economic Theory & Mathematical Economics, Game Theory & Applications, Microeconomics

Owen Powell, assistant professor
Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Economic Growth

Heiko Rachinger, assistant professor
Econometrics, Macroeconomics
Karl Schlag, professor  
Choice without priors. Applied to auctions, search, learning, pricing, imitation and exact nonparametric statistics

Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, professor  
Competition Policy, Game Theory & Applications, Industrial Organization, Microeconomics, Pricing

Natalia Shestakova, assistant professor  
Experimental Economics, Industrial Organization

Gerhard Sorger, professor  
Macroeconomics, Growth & Development, Economic Theory & Mathematical Economics, Applied Game Theory

Tolvanen, Juha, assistant professor  
Microeconomics, Information Economics, Industrial Economics

James Tremewan, assistant professor  
Economics & Psychology, Experimental Economics, Public Economics & Political Economy

Matan Tsur, assistant professor  
Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Financial Economics, Behavioral Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran, professor  
Economics & Psychology, Economics & Sociology, Experimental Economics, Labor Economics, Microeconomics, Public Economics & Political Economy

Katharina Wick, assistant professor  
Environmental Economics, Game Theory & Applications, Growth & Development, Microeconomics, Public Economics & Political Economics

**Assisting & Visiting Staff**

**Tutors**

Bachleitner, Alena  
Lakicevic, Ivan  
Reuter, Robert  
Sagl, Stephan

**Study Assistants (Studienassistenten)**

Griebel, Ariane  
Gschwandtner, Wilfried  
Krenmair, Patrick  
Schmidt, Georg

**External Lecturers**

Baltzarek, Franz  
Benz, Matthias  
Duchateau, Kristin  
Kasberger, Bernhard  
Lewisch, Peter  
Milford, Karl  
Nermuth, Manfred  
Milica, Nikolic  
Rosner, Peter  
Schmid, Hans Bernhard  
Silgoner, Maria Antoinette  
Sing, Christine Simone  
Sobolev, Anton  
Weigel, Wolfgang  
Zessner-Spitzenberg Leopold
Externally Funded Personnel (research interests indicated, alphabetically)

**Axel Sonntag**, assistant professor  
Behavioral Economics, Lab/Online/Field Experiments, *Engineering* of Cost-Effective Policy Instruments

**Alexander K. Wagner**, assistant professor  
Behavioral Economics, Applied Game Theory, Political Economy, Strategy and Decision Making

PhD Students

The following persons are employees of the University (internally or externally funded)

- Atayev, Atabek
- Das, Sabyasachi
- Garbers, Hendre
- Hergovich, Philipp
- Hoffmann, Roman
- Kasberger, Bernhard
- Kerndler, Martin
- Khalil, Makram
- Kiss, Regina
- Krysoński, Eryk
- Lutz, Flora
- Mahmudiev, Yordan
- Majher, Pavol
- Martin, Simon
- Mişcişin, Ion
- Molnáróvá, Zuzana
- Nikolic, Milica
- Reshidi, Edona
- Sator, Georg
- Sobolev, Anton
- Spitzer, Florian
- Zessner-Spitzenberg, Leopold

Administrative Staff

**Sylvie Hansbauer**  
(Financial Administration (SAP), File Management of the Department Working Papers, Student Support, i3V & Univis System.)

**Annemarie Kellner**  
(Student & Faculty Support (master and diploma theses), eLearning support, Student Support, Annual Report, i3V & Univis System)

**Elisabeth Polster**  
(Course-Coordination, PhD-Economics Program, Student & Faculty Support, i3V & Univis System)

**Gabriele Prochaska**  
(General administrative support)

**Sandra Weißenböck**  
(Webmaster, i3V & Univis System, Project Administration, Student & Faculty Support, e-Learning, Document Research Activities)

**Heide Marie Wurm**  
(i3V & Univis System, Student & Faculty Support, Project Administration, u:cris)

**Isabelle Zimmer**  
(Administrative Support of Scientists in Research and Teaching, Web Publication, e-Learning, Student Support)
We congratulate the 32 Master students who completed their Master’s thesis and the one student who completed her PhD thesis.

## Master’s Theses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, First Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Supervisor(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOGENSPERGER, Julia</td>
<td>Quantitative easing and its effects on the economy in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS, Sebastiaan Luigi</td>
<td>The development and transformation of a monetary union</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELLINGER, Fanny Helene</td>
<td>Will we eliminate poverty until 2030? An assessment based on the Growth Elasticity of Poverty</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUDAKOVIC, Erna</td>
<td>The Impact Of Migration From Eastern Europe To EU With Focus On Labor Market</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DÜRMEIER, Stefan</td>
<td>Monetary Policy and Capital Requirements</td>
<td>Sorger Gerhard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSL, Natascha Caroline</td>
<td>Do the Benefits of Barrier-free accessibility justify its Costs?</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GELLER, Michel</td>
<td>Assessing type I and type II error probabilities for basic regression methods and an exact monotonicity test, in binary choice environments</td>
<td>Schlag Karl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROENEVELD, Chantal</td>
<td>Rechtsökonomische Analyse von Antidiskriminierungsgesetzen</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSCHWANDTNER, Wilfried</td>
<td>Verteilungseffekte von Erbschaftssteuern</td>
<td>Podczeck Konrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUTTMANN, Therese</td>
<td>Reason for Migration, Human Capital and Wage Assimilation</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOFER, Mario</td>
<td>Reevaluating Policy Reaction Functions in a Data-Rich Environment</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOLESNIK, Michael</td>
<td>Economic perspective of Whistleblowing</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOUTSOMITOPOULOS, Konstantinos</td>
<td>Is The Trips Agreement A Disadvantage For Developing Countries?</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUCERA, Boris</td>
<td>Financial Stability and Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank</td>
<td>Sorger Gerhard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNSTAROVA, Andrea</td>
<td>Macroeconomic determinants of exchange-rate volatility in the countries of Visegrad four</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARGINEAN, Valentin</td>
<td>Basel III and its alternatives: impact on the EU</td>
<td>Weigel Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALMERS, Julian</td>
<td>Borda Voting, Theory And Implementation</td>
<td>Podczeck Konrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTACEK, Peter</td>
<td>Economic Analysis of Cholecystectomy using Austrian LKF-Data</td>
<td>Rauner Marion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARIKAYA, Deniz</td>
<td>The impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows in large economies and developing countries</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAJLAGIC, Nedžad</td>
<td>Democracy, Economic Freedom And Growth: Dynamic Panel Analysis</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPETH, Julia</td>
<td>Preference handling in combinational domains in the context of collective decision making</td>
<td>Podczeck Konrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YILDIRIM, Hatice</td>
<td>Auction Design for Allocating RE-Systems</td>
<td>Ania Martinez, Ana Begona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZENZ, David-Philipp</td>
<td>Nowcasting GDP mittels VAR-Modell</td>
<td>Kunst Robert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PhD Theses:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, First Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Supervisor(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEIDENHOLZER, Elke</td>
<td>Essays in Behavioral Economics</td>
<td>Müller, Wieland (supervisor); Balafoulas, Loukas (external committee); Mengel, Friederike (external committee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journals (alphabetically by author)


Janssen, Maarten, with Karamychev, Vladimir, **Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions**, Games and Economic Behavior, **100**, issue 1, p. 186-207.


Podczeck, Konrad, with Greinecker, Michael, **Edgeworth’s conjecture and the number of agents and commodities**, Economic Theory, June 2016, Volume **62**, Issue 1, pp 93–130


Tyran, Jean-Robert, with Huck, Steffen, Lünser, Gabriele, and Spitzer, Florian, **Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment. A Laboratory Experiment**, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, **131**, issue 1, p. 78-105.

Tyran, Jean-Robert, with Cappelen, Alexander W., Nielsen, Ulrik H., Tungodden, B., and Wengström, Erik, **Fairness is Intuitive**, Experimental Economics, **19**, issue 4, p. 727-740.

Tyran, Jean-Robert, with Andersson, Ola, Holm, Hakan, and Wengström, Erik, **Risk Aversion Relates to Cognitive Ability: Fact or Fiction?**, Journal of the European Economic Association, **14**, issue 5, p. 1129-1154.


Wick, Katharina, with Breitwieser, Anja, (2016), What We Miss By Missing Data: Aid Effectiveness Revisited, World Development, 78, issue 1, p. 554-571.
**Working Papers** (in order of publication)


**Mariya Teteryatnikova**  
*The Role of Asymmetry*, January 2016  
Abstract:  
Countries differ substantially in their exposure to international trade as determined by the number of their trade partners. This exposure to trade and the asymmetry in trade exposure are anticipated by firms when making their R&D investments. We model a choice of R&D investments by firms in a given trade network focusing on the effects of the network asymmetry. The two large classes of networks considered include asymmetric hub-and-spoke networks and symmetric networks. We find that R&D, productivity and welfare are highest in a hub economy and lowest in a spoke, and the larger the degree of network asymmetry, the larger the difference. A country in a symmetric network exhibits intermediate levels of R&D and welfare, even if the number of its trade partners is the same as in a hub or in a spoke. This implies that regional/preferential trade agreements, which result in a highly asymmetric trade network, benefit hub economies but harm spokes. By contrast, multilateral trade agreements, which lead to a symmetric complete network, generate equal R&D and welfare benefits for all countries.

**Melis Kartal and James Tremewan**  
*An offer you can refuse: the effects of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest*, March 2016  
Abstract:  
This paper studies the effects of transparency on information transmission and decision-making theoretically and experimentally. We develop a model in which a decision maker seeks the advice of a better-informed adviser. Before giving advice, the adviser may choose to accept a side payment from a third party, where accepting this payment binds the adviser to give a particular recommendation, which may or may not be dishonest. Transparency enables the decision maker to learn the decision of the adviser with respect to the side payment. Prior research has shown that transparency is either ineffective or harmful to decision makers because conflicted advisers become more dishonest in their advice. The novelty of our model is that the conflict of interest is endogenous as the adviser can choose to decline the third-party payment. Our theoretical results predict that transparency is never harmful and may help decision makers. Our experimental results show that transparency improves the accuracy of decision making. However, we also observe that (i) while transparency clearly improves decision making when it is mandatory, the evidence in favor of a voluntary form of transparency is much weaker, and that (ii) the positive effects of transparency decline over time.
Wieland Müller with Ayse Gül Mermer and Sigrid Suetens

**Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes**, March 2016

Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of transparency on information transmission and decision-making theoretically and experimentally. We develop a model in which a decision maker seeks the advice of a better-informed adviser. Before giving advice, the adviser may choose to accept a side payment from a third party, where accepting this payment binds the advisor to give a particular recommendation, which may or may not be dishonest. Without transparency, the decision maker learns only the recommendation of the adviser. With transparency, the decision maker learns in addition the decision of the adviser with respect to the side payment. Prior research has shown that transparency is either ineffective or harmful to decision makers because conflicted advisers become more dishonest in their advice. The novelty of our model is that the conflict of interest is endogeneous as the adviser can choose to decline the third-party payment. Our theoretical results predict that transparency is never harmful and may help decision makers. Our experimental results show that transparency improves the accuracy of decision making. However, we also observe that (i) while transparency clearly improves decision making when it is mandatory, the evidence in favor of a voluntary form of transparency is much weaker, and that (ii) the positive effects of transparency decline over time.

Paul Pichler and Gerhard Sorger

**The value of commitment and delegation for the control of greenhouse gas emissions**, June 2016

Abstract:
We analyze a stylized model of a world consisting of a large number of countries, which derive utility from energy consumption but suffer both from the emission of greenhouse gases (smog, black carbon, etc.) as well as from the external effects caused by climate change. The countries decide individually on investments in clean (i.e., emission free) technologies for energy production, whereas a supranational environmental authority decides for each country on the maximally permitted amount of emissions of greenhouse gases. We demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses. Yet these welfare losses can be kept small if the mandate for the authority penalizes the local cost of emissions very heavily but puts little or no weight at all on the cost of climate change.
Francesco Lancia and Alessia Russo  
**Cooperation in Organization through Self-Commitment Actions**, June 2016  
Abstract:  
This paper studies how an organization might promote cooperation between its members when individual contributions to the organization's output are imperfectly observable. It considers an overlapping-generation game in which members with conflicting interests expend effort in pursuing outside tasks that are perfectly observable and privately beneficial in addition to the effort devoted to increasing the organization's output. We show that both the organization's expected output and members' well-being increase when the reward and punishment mechanism links the two types of effort. In the resulting equilibrium, privately beneficial efforts are at an inefficient level in order to signal members' willingness to cooperate. After extending the game to multiple generations, we apply it to the optimal tasks assignment along career paths in an organization.

James Tremewan with Matteo Rizzolli  
**Hard Labour in the lab: Are monetary and non-monetary sanctions really substitutable?**, June 2016  
Abstract:  
The theory of optimal deterrence suggests the substitution of monetary sanctions over non-monetary sanctions whenever this is possible because non-monetary sanctions are more socially costly. This prescription is based on the assumption that monetary and non-monetary sanctions are perfect substitutes: there exists a monetary equivalent of a non-monetary sanction that, if used as a one, produces the same level of deterrence. We test this assumption with an experiment. In our stealing game potential thieves face the possibility of punishment. Our non-monetary sanction treatments mimic hard labour: we require convicted individuals to carry out a tedious real effort task. In the monetary treatments sanctions are instead ones, which are based on individuals' willingness to pay to avoid the effort task to ensure comparability to the non-monetary treatment. A second manipulation of our experiment concerns the balance of errors in the adjudication procedure (convictions of innocents and acquittal of guilty individuals). We and that stealing is reduced most effectively by a sanction regime that combines non-monetary sanctions with a severe procedure. Our data is consistent with the notion that both monetary punishment and pro-defendant sanction regimes are less effective in communicating moral condemnation of an act.

Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger  
**On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction**, July 2016  
Abstract  
The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been frequently used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase with subsequent VCG pricing in order to maximize price discovery and efficiency. We inquire into the role of the clock when bidders have lexicographic preferences for raising rivals' costs. All equilibria of the CCA are inefficient if there is substantial room for price discovery, that is, if there is large uncertainty concerning the competitor's type. Conversely, in all efficient equilibria price discovery is limited. Qualitative features of our equilibria are in line with evidence concerning bidding behavior in some recent CCAs.
James Tremewan
**Gender Differences in Beliefs and Actions in a Framed Corruption Experiment**

Abstract:
We elicit actions and beliefs in a framed corruption experiment enabling us to investigate how gender differences in corrupt behaviour relate to gender differences in both beliefs about the behaviour of others and the relationship between those beliefs and actions. We find that women are less likely to engage in costly punishment of corruption, and believe corruption to be more prevalent than men. Differences between the genders in the relationship between beliefs and actions provides evidence that men experience a greater psychological cost as a result of social sanctions. Controlling for beliefs and gender differences in sensitivity to beliefs we find that males are, in many instances, more likely to offer bribes, while females are less likely to conform to a norm of bribe-giving. This result was not apparent in the raw data, and highlights the importance of considering beliefs in corruption experiments.

James Tremewan with Christoph Vanberg
**The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves, October 2016**

Abstract:
We experimentally investigate behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game played in continuous time. Subjects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distribution of payments which occur at regular time intervals. During a given interval, payments occur if and only if a majority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process. We investigate the frequency and stability of different types of agreements, as well as transitions between them. Two-thirds of payments involve divisions where one player receives nothing, almost half of which are equal splits of the entire surplus between two players. The most stable division is the three-way equal split. Transitions between agreements are frequent and are generally consistent with myopic payoff maximization, in the sense that subjects do not accept short-term losses. We also find that transitions between coalitions are not Markovian. In particular, players more often forgo short-term gains in order to remain in a coalition if it has proven stable in the past.
Gerhard Sorger with Partha Dasgupta and Tapan Mitra

**Harvesting the Commons, December 2016**

Abstract:
We study a socio-ecological model in which a continuum of consumers harvest a common property renewable natural resource. Markov perfect Nash equilibria of the corresponding non-cooperative game are derived and are compared with collectively optimal harvesting policies. The underlying mechanisms that drive open-access commons in our model are shaped by population size, harvesting costs, and the ecosystem’s productivity. If other things equal population is small relative to harvesting costs, unmanaged commons do not face destruction. More strikingly, they are harvested at the collectively optimal rate. Property rights do not matter in that parametric regime because the resource has no social scarcity value. However, if other things equal population is large relative to harvesting costs, open-access renewable natural resources suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Property rights matter there because the resource has a social scarcity price. The population size relative to harvesting costs at which the socio-ecological system bifurcates is an increasing function of the ecosystem’s productivity. A sudden crash in productivity, population overshoot, or decline in harvesting costs can tip an unmanaged common into ruin. The model provides a way to interpret historical and archaeological findings on the collapse of those societies that have been studied by scholars.

Maarten C.W. Janssen and Mariya Teteryatnikova

**Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition, December 2016**

Abstract:
This paper studies firms' incentives to disclose horizontal product attributes in a competitive environment. With competition, two elements play an important role: whether (i) firms can disclose only their own product characteristics or also those of their competitors, and whether (ii) competitors can react with their pricing decisions to the type of information disclosed. In all possible cases, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, it is generically the unique equilibrium outcome when (i) advertising is comparative and (ii) prices are also advertised, that is, announced simultaneously with the product information. When advertising is noncomparative or prices are not advertised, many nondisclosure equilibria exist.
## DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH

### Faculty in the News

Economic thinking can be applied to many issues and economists offer advice and opinions to a broad range of topics. Below we list recent contributions to dissemination of research, public debate, interviews and public speeches of our faculty. Authors express their personal views.

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<td>Reich heiratet Reich, Arm heiratet Arm</td>
<td>Marc Goni</td>
<td>Public Economics &amp; Political Economy</td>
<td>2016-12-24</td>
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<td>Die Zukunft mit Trump (Beitrag)</td>
<td>Alejandro Cunat</td>
<td>International Economics</td>
<td>2016-11-10</td>
<td>Medienportal U Wien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefize für die Spitze</td>
<td>Peter Rosner</td>
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<td>&quot;Brexit&quot; und die Wirtschaft</td>
<td>Kunibert Raffer</td>
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<td>Interview on replication in economics</td>
<td>Jean-Robert Tyran</td>
<td>Experimental Economics</td>
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<td>SWR2 Campus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nudging: Wie der Staat seine Bürger erziehen will</td>
<td>Jean-Robert Tyran</td>
<td>Economics &amp; Psychology</td>
<td>2016-02-16</td>
<td>Ö1 - Orf.at</td>
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<td>Die Ö1 Kinderuni</td>
<td>Paul Pichler</td>
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<td>2016-01-17</td>
<td>Ö1 - Orf.at</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schaltjahre: Babys und Wahlen sorgen für einen Kick</td>
<td>Paul Pichler</td>
<td>Macroeconomics</td>
<td>2016-01-07</td>
<td>Wirtschaftsblatt</td>
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</table>
Workshops & Conferences

**Workshop on Auctions and Market Design**
August 29, 2016

*Organizers:*
Maarten Janssen (U Vienna)
Bernhard Kasberger (U Vienna)

*Speakers:*
Lawrence M. Ausubel (U Maryland)
Oleg Baranov (University of Colorado)
Martin Bichler (Technische Universität)
Justin Burkett (Wake Forest University)
Peter Cramton (University of Maryland)
Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr (Universit Oslo)
Vitali Gretschko (ZEW Mannheim)
Sergei Izmalkov (New Economic School)
Bernhard Kasberger (University of Vienna)
Simon Loertscher (University of Melbourne)
Leslie Marx (Duke University)
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
David Salant (Toulouse School of Economics)
Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
Achim Wambach (ZEW Mannheim)

**Vienna Behavioral Economics Network**

**Behavioral Economics: Field Experiments as a Revolution in Economics & Politics**
September 7, 2016

*Organizers:*
Vienna Behavioral Economics Network

*Speakers:*
John List (U Chicago)
Jean-Robert Tyran (U Vienna)

**Behavioral Economics: The Power of Nudges – Einsatz & Grenzen sanfter Stupser**
December 5, 2016

*Organizers:*
Vienna Behavioral Economics Network

*Speakers:*
Gerhard Fehr (CEO FehrAdvice & Partners AG)
Jean-Robert Tyran (U Vienna)
Workshop in Behavioral Public Economics

September 8

**Organizers:**
- Rupert Sausgruber (Vienna U Econ. & Business)
- Jean-Robert Tyran (U Vienna)

**Speakers:**
- Ingvild Almas (NHH Bergen)
- Lucas Coffman (Harvard University)
- David Cooper (Florida State U)
- Lorenz Goette (U Bonn)
- Shaun Hargreaves Heap (King's College London)
- Nagore Irriberri (U Basque Country)
- John List (U Chicago)
- Theo Offerman (U Amsterdam)

Conference “Joseph Schumpeter heute”

**Organizers:**
- Manfred Nermuth (U Vienna)
- Peter Rosner (U Vienna)

**Speakers:**
- Günther Chaloupek
- Martin Hellwig (Max Planck Institute For Collective Goods, Bonn)
- Hansjörg Klausinger (WU Vienna)
- Heinz D. Kurz (Karl-Franzens-U Graz)
- Michael Peneder (Austrian Institute of Econ. Research, WIFO)

Current Research Grants

**Fairness, personal responsibility, and the welfare state**
2015 – 2018
Sponsered by NORFACE
(Contact persons: Jean-Robert Tyran)

**FIW Cooperation Project**
2013 – 2018
Sponsored by Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend
(Contact person: Alejandro Cunat)

**Information and Consumer Research**
2015 - 2017
Funded by FWF
(Contact person: Maarten Janssen)

**Representative Democracy: Theory and Experiments**
2014 – 2017
Sponsored by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(Contact persons: Jean-Robert Tyran, Alexander K. Wagner)
Representative Democracy: Theory and Experiments
2014-17
(ongoing) Project grant from German Research Foundation
(Contact person: Alexander K. Wagner)

Monetary Policy Tradeoffs under Global Commodity Price Movements
2014 – 2016
Funded by Austrian Central Bank’s Anniversary Fund
(Contact person: Alejandro Cunat)
Seminars

Vienna Joint Economic Seminar (VJES)
(joint with the Institute for Advanced Studies)

http://econ.univie.ac.at/research/research-seminars/vienna-joint-economics-seminar/

March 3
Rosemarie Nagel (U Pompeu Fabra)
*De-Framing the Rules to (De)-Anchor Beliefs in Beauty Contest Games*
Dov Samet (Tel Aviv U)
The sure-thing principle as originally intended

March 17
Aviad Heifetz (The Open University of Israel)
*Gratification and flourishing: well-being in interaction*
Peter Cramton (U Maryland)
*An Open Access Wireless Market (with Linda Doyle)*

April 14
Giancarlo Corsetti (U Cambridge)
*Capital flows and monetary policy trade-offs*
Christoph Kuzmics (University of Graz)
*Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations*

April 28
Andrea Weber (WU Vienna)
*Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality? (with Arash Nekoei)*
Margaret Meyer (U Oxford)
*Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision*

May 12
Pierpaolo Battigalli (U Bocconi)
*A Framework for the Analysis of Self-Confirming Policies (with S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, T. Sargent)*
Thomas Gehrig (U Vienna)
*Rumors and Runs in Opaque Markets: Evidence from the Panic of 1907 (with Caroline Fohlin and Marlene Haas)*

June 2
Rakesh Vohra (U Pennsylvania)
*Scarf’s Lemma and Stable Matchings*
Gilles Saint-Paul (Paris School of Economics)
*Credit institutions in an evolving economy*
June 16
Larry Blume and Klaus Ritzberger
*A Case for Incomplete Markets*

June 30
Alessandro Lizzeri (New York U)
*The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements*
Jakub Kastl (Princeton U)
*Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction (with Ali Hortacsu and Allen Zhang)*

October 6
Mathias Trabandt (FU Berlin)
*Fiscal Multipliers in a nonlinear world (with Jesper Linde)*
Manuel Bagues (Aalto University)
*Can gender quotas empower women? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design (with Pamela Campa)*

October 13
Benjamin Born (University of Bonn)
*Does Austerity Pay Off?“ (with Gernot Müller and Johannes Pfeifer)*
Paul Schweinzer (University of Klagenfurt)
*Optimal team composition and the Apollo Syndrome (with Alex Gershkov)*

November 3
Rudolf Kerschbamer (University of Innsbruck)
*Why did he do that? Isolating the relative importance of different conditional motivations for second-mover behavior in two-player two-stage games*

November 17
Martin Gonzales Eiras (University of Copenhagen)
*Why Might the Old Want to Honor Sovereign Debt?*
John Duffy (University of California, Irvine)
*Adoption of a new payment method: Theory and experimental evidence (with Jasmina Arifovic and Janet Hua Jiang)*

December 1
Paola Manzini (University of St. Andrews)
*Bounded Cognition and Population Choices (with Valentino Dardanoni, Marco Mariotti and Christopher Tyson)*

Ernst Fehr (University of Zürich)
*Degustibus est disputandum - How Society Shapes Preferences*
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics Seminar (VCEE-Seminar)

http://vcee.univie.ac.at/seminars/

January 22
Veronika Grimm (FAU)
*On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining*
Abhijit Ramalingam (U East Anglia)
*Resource Inequality in Competition Between Teams*

February 16
oTree Workshop: Chris Wickens (oTree developer)

March 18
Florian Zimmermann (U Zürich)
*Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation*
Michal Bauer (CERGE-EI)
*Social Contagion of Ethnic Hostility*

15. April
Alexander F. Wagner (U Zurich)
*How do social norms affect corporate behavior? An experiment regarding the choice of honesty*
Christoph Vanberg (U Heidelberg)
*Who never tells a lie?*

May 27
Daniel Friedman (UC Santa Cruz)
*Online Ad Auctions: An Experiment (by Kevin McLaughlin and Daniel Friedman)*
Astrid Dannenberg (U Kassel)
*Naming and shaming“ of individuals and groups in a public goods experiment*

June 17
Marco Piovesan (U Copenhagen)
Dishonesty from the Lab to the Field
Arthur Schram (EUI Florence)
*A Simultaneous Analysis of Turnout and Voting under Proportional Representation: Theory and Experiments*

October 7
Séverine Toussaert (LSE London)
*Eliciting temptation and self-control through menu choices: a lab experiment*
Dominik Duell (IAS Toulouse)
*Identity and Political Polarization: On the Instrumental Impact of Partisan Identity (joint with Justin Valasek, WZB)*
November 11
Robert Östling (IIES Stockholm)
The Effect of Wealth on Subjective Health, Life Satisfaction and Political Attitudes

Simeon Schudy (LMU München)
*I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups (with Martin Kocher and Lisa Spantig, available at SSRN)*

December 16
VCEE Seminar: Marie-Claire Villeval (Lyon)
*Loss Aversion and lying behavior: Theory, estimation and empirical evidence*. The paper is co-authors with Ellen Garbarino and Robert Slonim

Redzo Mujcic (WU Vienna)
*Indirect Reciprocity and Prosocial Behaviour: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment*

### International Visitors

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<tr>
<th>Visitor</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Time of Visit</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dan Zeltzer</td>
<td>Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>March 29 - March 31, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nemanja Antic</td>
<td>Kellogg, Northwestern University</td>
<td>April 3 - April 7, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuya Takahashi</td>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>May 30 - June 10, 2016</td>
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REPORT OF ACTIVITIES BY THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER

(alphabetically, by last name)

**Alejandro CUNAT**

Presentation of research results:

- *Research seminars*: Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), Universidad de Murcia, Università di Trento

Other activities and affiliations:

- *Research fellow* at CES-ifo (Munich) and CeFiG (Budapest)
- *Member* of PhD committees: Calin-Vlad Demian (Central European University) and Andrei Potlogea (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
- *Program committee member*: 2016 Meeting of the European Economic Association (Geneva)
- *Member* of the European Science Foundation College of Expert Reviewers

**Daniel GARCIA**

Presentation of research results

- Conferences: Workshop on Switching and Consumer Search (Hangzhou, China, May 2016)

**Marc GONI-TRAFAQH**

- *Research seminars*: Université catholique Louvain, UC Merced, University of Innsbruck, WU.
Maarten JANSSEN

Other activities and affiliations


Robert KUNST

Presentation of research results


Other activities and affiliations

- **Research grants**: there was this project with Luise Breinlinger. FA374006 Modelling Banking Crises (Projektede: 20.08.2016)
- **Research fellows**: I am a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
- **Editorial tasks**: editor of Empirical Economics
- **Academic Services**: Vice-SPL (from October 2016)
- **Refereeing**: refereed for several journals (Econometrics and Statistics, Economics Bulletin, Empirica, Empirical Economics, Computational Statistics and Data Analysis etc.)

Francesco LANCIA

Presentation of research results

- **Conferences**: Theory and Environment Workshop (Oslo, March 2016); NOeG Annual Meeting (Bratislava, May 2016); NBER-Summer Institute Income Distribution and Macroeconomics (Cambridge, July 2016); MIPP Workshop in Political Economy & Political Science (Santiago del Chile, Sep. 2016); 10th CESifo Workshop on Political Economy (Dresden, Nov. 2016); European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (Edinburgh, Dec. 2016)

Eeva MAURING

Presentation of research results

- **Conferences**: SaM Annual Conference (University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam), Royal Economic Society Conference (University of Sussex, Brighton)
- **Research Seminars**: U Miami, Humboldt University (Berlin), BI Norwegian Business School (Oslo)

Other activities and affiliations

- **Refereeing**: Economic Journal
Iacopo MORCHIO
Presentation of research results

- **Research Seminars**: University of Innsbruck, University of Oslo
- **Conferences**: Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting, Econometric Society European Summer Meeting, NOeG-SEA Annual Meeting
- **Discussions**: Mannheim Macroeconomics Workshop

Other activities and affiliations

- **Research Grant**: Hardegg Grant, project "Unemployment Insurance and Postunemployment Outcomes", joint with Javier-Fernandez Blanco (U Autonoma de Barcelona)
- **Refereeing**: Macroeconomic Dynamics, Labour Economics, Empirica
- **Visitor** at the University of Oslo, August - September 2016

Monika MERZ
Presentation of research results

- **Conferences**: European Summer Symposium of International Macroeconomics (short: ESSIM) 2016, May 24-27, Helsinki, Finland
- **Research Seminars**: Universität Köln, Mai 2016

Other activities and affiliations

- **Research Fellow**, CEPR, London, since 2010
- **Member**: Institut zur Erforschung der Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn, since 2001
- **Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee** of the CEPR, London, since September 2012; corresponding member of the historic-philosophical class of the Austrian Academy of Science (ÖAW), Vienna, since 2013
- **Editorial Tasks**: Member, Editorial Board, *Applied Economics Quarterly*, since 2002
- **Academic Services**: Head of Department and member of the Senate of the University of Vienna since October 2016; member search committee for a full professorship in Economic Policy; member habilitation committee C. Vithessonthi and M. Leitner; member doctoral funding programme uni:docs, University of Vienna
- **External member of PhD committee of Balazs Reizer, CEU Budapest**
- **Refereeing**: Journal of European Economic Association; Quantitative Economics; Review of Economic Studies
Wieland MÜLLER

Activities and affiliations

- **Other Affiliation** (part time): Tilburg University, Department of Economics (Full Professor)
- **Research fellow** at VCEE (Vienna, Co-Director), CentER (Tilburg), TILEC (Tilburg)
- **Editorial Tasks**: Member Editorial Board of *Experimental Economics* and *Journal of the Economic Science Association*
- **Main supervisor of completed PhD thesis**: Christopher Nell (U Vienna, VGSE)
- Member Scientific Advisory Board of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
- **Departmental Activities**: Head of Department (until September 2016)
- **Research seminars**: Cerge-EI Prague, U Innsbruck, U Nürnberg, U Tilburg, U Tel Aviv, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliy, U Potsdam, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

Owen POWELL

- **Conferences**: Experimental Finance (Mannheim); Workshop on the Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents (WEHIA), Castelló de la Plana

Paul PICHLER

Presentation of research results

- **Conferences**: NEoG Meeting (Bratislava, Slowakia), Computing in Economics and Finance (Bordeaux, France)

Heiko RACHINGER

Presentation of research results

- **Conferences**: International Conference on Computational and Financial Econometrics (CFE, Dec. 2016, Sevilla, Spain); Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association and the Slovak Economic Association (NOeG-SEA, May 2016)
- Research seminars: Econometrics seminar at the University of Maastricht, June 2016
Philipp SCHMIDT-DENGLER

Presentation of research results

- **Research Seminars:**
  

- **Conferences:** Conference *Presentation* at the Annual Meeting of the Committee for Industrial Economics (Ausschuss für Industrieökonomie), Verein für Socialpolitik, Regensburg, March 2016


- **External Dissertation Reviewer and Examiner:** Giulia Pavan: "Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization", University of Rome Tor Vergata

- **External Hiring Committee Member, Vacancy in Economics, Catholic University Leuven**

- **Senior Hiring Committee:** Professorship in Economic Policy, University of Vienna

- **External Promotion Evaluator:** University of Cyprus

- **External Reviewer:** Professorship in Competition and Regulation, University of Mannheim, Germany

- **Conference Organization:** Organizer: Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economics Association, Bratislava, May 2016

- Main referee: Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, September 2016;

- **Conference Programme Committee Member:** International Association for Applied Econometrics Conference, University of Milan-Bicocca (Italy), June 2016

- **Scientific Committee:** Annual Meeting of the European Economic Association (EEA), August 2016 in Geneva; ZEW-MaCCI, 5th Mannheim Energy Conference, May 2016; European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Lisbon, Portugal, August 2016;


Other activities and affiliations

- **Affiliations:** CEPR Industrial Organization Programme, Research Affiliate until June 2015, Research Fellow from July 2015; CES-Ifo Network Affiliate, since 2008; ZEW Research Associate, since 2011; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (Wifo), Scientific Consultant, since May 2015

- **Editorial Tasks:** Co-Editor International Journal of Industrial Organization, since 2014; Editorial Board Member; Review of Economic Studies, since 2012; Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, since 2015

- **Associate Editor:** Journal of Applied Econometrics, since 2014; Journal of the European Economic Association, since 2013; International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009-2013
• Other activities: Quantitative Economics Doctorate (QED), Coordinator at the University of Vienna, and Jamboree Participation, Amsterdam, May 2016

Karl SCHLAG

Other activities and affiliations


Axel SONNTAG

Presentation of research results

• Workshop: Workshop on Lab Experiments in Public Economics, Mannheim, Germany, Feb. 2016;
• Conferences: 3rd International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), Rome, Italy, April 2016; SABE / IAREP Conference, Wageningen, The Netherlands, July 2016

Other activities and affiliations


Gerhard SORGER

Presentation of research results

• Lunch Seminar at the Univ. of Luxembourg (Luxembourg)
• Conferences: EULOG 2016: Workshop in Honor of R.F. Hartl (Vienna), Verein für Socialpolitik – Annual Conference (Basel, Switzerland)

Other activities and affiliations

Mariya TETERYATNIKOVA
Other activities and affiliations
• Refereeing: Vienna Economics Papers

James TREMEWAN
Presentation of research results
• Conferences: Economic Science Association European Conference (Bergen), Stony Brook Game Theory Conference, Network Science and Economics Workshop (Stanford University)
• Research seminars: U Innsbruck, Groupe d'Analyse et de Theorie Economique (Lyon)

Other activities and affiliations

Matan TSUR
Presentation of research results
• Research seminars: University of California San Diego, University of California Santa Barbara, University of California (California), University of California Riverside, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (Bonn, Germany)

Jean-Robert TYRAN
Presentation of research results
• Lecture for the general public: „Alternative Mikroökonomie“ (WU Vienna), "Was ist mein Geld in 10 Jahren wert?", Uni Wien,
• Other: Academy of Behavioral Economics (Rüschlikon, Zurich)
• Research seminars: U Innsbruck, LMU Munich, U Konstanz, FAU Nürnberg,

Other activities and affiliation
• **Research fellow at CEPR**, Centre for Economic Policy Research (London); EPRU, Economic Policy Research Unit (Copenhagen); Choice Lab (NHH Bergen); CAMA, Center for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (ANU Canberra), Visiting Professor U Copenhagen, U St. Gallen

• **Professional organizations**: Board member: Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association)


• **External reviewer** for tenure decision at California Institute of Technology (Caltech), Pasadena.

• **Academic services**: Dean of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics U Vienna, Director of VCEE, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics.

• **Organization of workshops**: 4th VCEE Awayday, “Behavioral Public Economics” (with R. Sausgruber), Fairness, Personal Responsibility, and the Welfare State” (with A. Sonntag)

• **Organization of public events**: “Field experiments as a revolution in economics and politics” and “The power of nudges” (both at Industriellenvereinigung)

• **Refereeing**: Experimental Economics, Journal of Experimental Political Science, Games and Economic Behavior

**Alexander WAGNER**

Presentation of research results

• **Workshops**: Workshop on Fairness, Personal Responsibility, and the Welfare State, University of Vienna

• **Conferences**: Austrian Economic Association Annual Meeting (NOeG-SAE), Bratislava, 5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES 2016), Maastricht

Other activities and affiliation

• **Refereeing for**: Journal of Economic Psychology

• **Other activities**: (Ongoing) Project grant from German Research Foundation, “Representative Democracy: Theory and Experiments”, 2014-17
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