Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

Author(s)
Karl Schlag, Peter Vida
Abstract

In an equilibrium framework, we explore how players communicate in games with multiple Nash equilibria when messages that make sense are not ignored. Communication is about strategies and not about private information. It begins with the choice of a language, followed by a message that is allowed to be vague. We focus on equilibria where the sender is believed whenever possible, and develop a theory of credible communication. We show that credible communication is sensitive to changes in the timing of communication. Sufficient conditions for communication leading to efficient play are provided.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
CY Cergy Paris University
Journal
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
50
Pages
867 - 889
No. of pages
23
ISSN
0020-7276
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00772-2
Publication date
12-2021
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502021 Microeconomics
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics and Econometrics, Mathematics (miscellaneous), Statistics and Probability, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/believing-when-credible-talking-about-future-intentions-and-past-actions(00992739-4ca1-4239-88d6-8851a40bb260).html