Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games

Author(s)
Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck
Abstract

We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player's payoff depends on his choice and the distribution of the choices made by others). We show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games with finite action spaces and for generic distributions of players' payoff functions. We also show that equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable in terms of Nash equilibria of large finite-player games. Extensions of these results to games with general compact metric action spaces are provided.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
University of Surrey
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
187
No. of pages
35
ISSN
0022-0531
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105015
Publication date
05-2020
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502047 Economic theory
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics and Econometrics
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/pure-strategy-nash-equilibria-of-large-finiteplayer-games-and-their-relationship-to-nonatomic-games(719c2853-58bb-4d29-b4e6-b4e7ff611965).html