Laboratory Federalism: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process
- Author(s)
- Ana Begona Ania Martinez, Andreas Wagener
- Abstract
In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover
- Journal
- Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Volume
- 16
- Pages
- 767-795
- No. of pages
- 29
- ISSN
- 1097-3923
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12079
- Publication date
- 10-2013
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502021 Microeconomics
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Sociology and Political Science
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/laboratory-federalism-the-open-method-of-coordination-omc-as-an-evolutionary-learning-process(878e4034-0225-480a-bb33-831ca0ff1a6b).html