More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments
- Author(s)
- Werner Güth, Martin G. Kocher
- Abstract
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
- Organisation(s)
- External organisation(s)
- Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Queensland University of Technology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
- Journal
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
- Volume
- 108
- Pages
- 396-409
- No. of pages
- 14
- ISSN
- 0167-2681
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006
- Publication date
- 12-2014
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502045 Behavioural economics
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/d3f6531e-896a-4767-b6ad-9f6d82555354