Preference Reversals: Time and Again

Author(s): Alexander K. Wagner, Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Dura-Georg Granic, Johannes Kern
Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision times in the choice task. In a first experiment, we replicated the standard reversal pattern and found that choices associated with reversals take significantly longer than non-reversals, and non-reversal choices take longer whenever long-shot lotteries are selected. These results can be explained by a combination of noisy lottery evaluations (imprecise preferences) and an overpricing phenomenon associated with the compatibility hypothesis. The first cause explains the existence of reversals, while the second explains the predominance of a particular type thereof. A second experiment showed that the overpricing phenomenon can be shut down, greatly reducing reversals, by using ranking-based, ordinally-framed evaluation tasks. This experiment also disentangled the two determinants of reversals, because imprecise evaluations still deliver testable predictions on decision times even in the absence of the overpricing phenomenon. Strikingly, when unframed ranking tasks were used, decision times in the choice phase were greatly reduced, even though this phase was identical across treatments. This observation is consistent with psychological insights on conflicting decision processes.
Organisation(s): Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s): Universität zu Köln
Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Volume: 52
Pages: 65-97
No. of pages: 33
ISSN: 0895-5646
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-016-9233-z
Publication date: 02-2016
Peer reviewed: Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012: 502045 Behavioural economics
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas: Economics and Econometrics, Accounting, Finance
Portal url: https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/preference-reversals-time-and-again(510d87ca-68fa-41d5-9b2c-89a4d50f65c1).html