Noncooperative resource exploitation by patient players

Author(s)
Tapan Mitra, Gerhard Sorger
Abstract

We consider a discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a non-renewable resource and derive consumption solely from the extracted amount (cake-eating game). Markov perfect Nash equilibria consisting of linear strategies can be constructed in this game not only if the players have time-preference factors that are smaller than 1, but also if these factors are equal to or even larger than 1. We demonstrate this result both for the case of identical players and for the case of heterogeneous players. In addition, we study the influence of the model parameters on the equilibrium.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
Cornell University
Journal
Dynamic Games and Applications
Volume
5
Pages
361 - 377
No. of pages
17
ISSN
2153-0785
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0135-5
Publication date
2015
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502047 Economic theory
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Computational Mathematics, Applied Mathematics, Statistics and Probability, Computer Science Applications, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/noncooperative-resource-exploitation-by-patient-players(59cefb1f-79c0-4736-ac65-457589b0c425).html