Discriminatory Taxes are Unpopular

Author(s)
Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran
Abstract

We explore the political acceptance of taxation in commodity markets. Participants in our experiment earn incomes by trading and must collectively choose one of the two tax regimes to raise a given tax revenue. A “uniform tax” (UT) imposes the same tax rate on all markets and is fair in that it yields the same – but low – income to participants in all markets. The “discriminatory tax” (DT) imposes a higher burden on markets with inelastic demand and is therefore efficient but it is also unfair in that incomes are unequal across markets. We find that DT is unpopular, as predicted. Surprisingly, however, DT remains unpopular when they are both efficient and produce a fair (equal) distribution. We conclude that non-discrimination (equal treatment) is a salient fairness principle in taxation that shapes voting on commodity taxes above and beyond concerns for efficiency and equal distribution

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU)
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume
108
Pages
463-476
No. of pages
14
ISSN
0167-2681
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.022
Publication date
2014
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502045 Behavioural economics, 502024 Public economy, 502038 Taxation
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/discriminatory-taxes-are-unpopular(a5e19e6e-d268-4f60-b82d-70ac83749a56).html