Simple bets to elicit private signals
- Author(s)
- Aurelien Baillon, Yan Xu
- Abstract
This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents’ private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Erasmus University Rotterdam
- Journal
- Theoretical Economics
- Volume
- 16
- Pages
- 777-797
- No. of pages
- 21
- ISSN
- 1933-6837
- Publication date
- 2021
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502045 Behavioural economics, 502047 Economic theory
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/simple-bets-to-elicit-private-signals(e3390a57-bb3f-40c6-8cc8-6c028981dd76).html