December 5, 2019
VGSE Seminar Room (3rd floor)
Program
15:45 Coffee, pastries, and refreshments
16:00 Gerhard Sorger (Head of Department): Welcome
16:15 Clemens Puppe (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) Strategy-Proofness Hinders Participation
17:15 Michael Greinecker (University of Graz) Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies
Abstracts:
Strategy-Proofness Hinders Participation (M. Müller, C. Puppe)
We study a two-stage voting model in which agents with single-peaked preferences determine the value of a one-dimensional variable. We assume that voting is costly and that agents must decide simultaneously whether or not to participate in the voting process. We show that, for all positive costs, there exists a (generically) unique subgame perfect equilibrium that has one single participant whenever the voting mechanism is strategy-proof, anonymous, efficient and minimally responsive in the sense that the outcome monotonically reacts to a unanimous move of the votes of all agents in one direction.
Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies (M. Greinecker, C. Kah)
We formulate a stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high-dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite-agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite-agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities.
