Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games

Author(s)
Céderic Argenton, Radosveta Ivanova Stenzel, Wieland Müller
Abstract

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.

Organisation(s)
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
Tilburg University, Technische Universität Berlin
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
144
Pages
1-12
No. of pages
12
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.12.004
Publication date
2024
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502021 Microeconomics
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics and Econometrics, Finance
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/cournot-meets-bayesnash-a-discontinuity-in-behavior-in-finitely-repeated-duopoly-games(3f611d99-dc96-4b14-bb51-0f8bab47036c).html