Civic Engagement, the Leverage Effect and the Accountable State
- Author(s)
- Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstract
A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the latter's civic engagement. As a public good in its own right, economic theory expects civic engagement to be underprovided. We conduct the first laboratory experiment in which participants can create a socially efficient central sanctioning scheme (representing the accountable state) through a prior stage of voluntary costly actions that are theoretically ruled out for strictly self-interested agents—a social dilemma. Our experimental subjects sustain civic engagement when its cost is modest, suggesting sustainable cooperation in linked social dilemmas perhaps due to a cost-benefit calculus we call “leverage.”
- Organisation(s)
- Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Keio University, Brown University
- Journal
- European Economic Review
- Volume
- 156
- ISSN
- 0014-2921
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104466
- Publication date
- 07-2023
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502057 Experimental economics, 502010 Public finance, 502027 Political economy
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics, Finance
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/civic-engagement-the-leverage-effect-and-the-accountable-state(53b3df61-93d5-428e-a4f9-797051897545).html