Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits
- Author(s)
- Ola Andersson, Hakan Holm, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström
- Abstract
Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others' risk exposure hardly requires "financial psychopaths" in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.
- Organisation(s)
- Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Lund University, Uppsala University, University of Copenhagen
- Journal
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Volume
- 122
- Pages
- 648-674
- No. of pages
- 27
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12353
- Publication date
- 03-2019
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502045 Behavioural economics
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/8ca8008c-63e9-44ab-a13e-70a8b43b8767