Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

Author(s)
Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck
Abstract

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
University of Surrey
Journal
Theoretical Economics
Volume
16
Pages
1055-1093
No. of pages
39
ISSN
1933-6837
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3967
Publication date
2020
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502047 Economic theory
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Portal url
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/b6953b1f-7d85-4308-ba09-4bbc43c2bd1e