Work motivation and teams
- Author(s)
- Simone Haeckl, Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstract
This paper presents a novel technique to measure motivation for working on a task using deviations from the money-maximising benchmark in a real-effort experiment. Although we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we also find that workers with high intrinsic motivation do not respond to team incentives. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard, and team incentives are not strong enough to overcome the high cost of additional effort.
- Organisation(s)
- Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU)
- Journal
- Economics Letters
- Volume
- 244
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112020
- Publication date
- 09-2024
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502057 Experimental economics, 502002 Labour economics
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/f76cb6e2-df1d-4de3-8db2-55a044cb3bf3