Money, depletion, and prosociality in the dictator game

Author(s): Anja Achtziger, Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Alexander K. Wagner
Abstract: We study the effects of ego depletion, a manipulation which consumes self-control resources, on social preferences in a dictator game. Depleted dictators give considerably less than nondepleted dictators and hence exhibit strong preferences for selfish allocation. In contrast to earlier studies, participants were explicitly paid for completing the ego-depletion task (with either a flat rate or strictly performance-based payment). We studied the dynamics of decisions by repeating the dictator game 12 times (anonymously). Depleted dictators start with much lower offers than nondepleted ones, but, strikingly, offers decrease in time for both groups, and more rapidly so for nondepleted dictators. We conclude that, whereas depleted dictators neglect fairness motives from the very first decision on, nondepleted dictators initially resist the tendency to act selfishly, but eventually become depleted or learn to act selfishly. Hence, pro-social behavior may be short-lived, and ego depletion uncovers the default tendencies for selfishness earlier.
Organisation(s): Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s): Zeppelin Universität, Universität zu Köln
Journal: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology and Economics
Volume: 8
Pages: 1-14
No. of pages: 14
ISSN: 1937-321X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/npe0000031
Publication date: 03-2015
Peer reviewed: Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012: 502045 Behavioural economics, 502021 Microeconomics
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology, Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous), Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous), Cognitive Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience, Applied Psychology
Portal url: https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/ffbe8883-9932-4dc7-a7bd-38d10d5690e5