Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice

Author(s)
Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Reuben, Jean-Robert Tyran
Abstract

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
University of Copenhagen, Columbia University in the City of New York
Journal
The Economic Journal
Volume
124
Pages
F163 - F195
ISSN
0013-0133
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12096
Publication date
02-2014
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Public economy
Keywords
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/competition-cooperation-and-collective-choice(02cbf7b4-ebc6-47e7-908f-9e3489c82baf).html