Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Author(s)
Ulrik H. Nielsen, Jean-Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström
Abstract

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
Lund University, University of Copenhagen
Journal
Economics Letters
Volume
122
Pages
136-139
ISSN
0165-1765
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021
Publication date
02-2014
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Economic theory
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/second-thoughts-on-free-riding(07a62ecf-a123-40fb-bb7d-49afb1757670).html