The dark side of the vote

Author(s)
Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean Robert Tyran
Abstract

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
New York University, University of Copenhagen
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
113
Pages
461-481
No. of pages
21
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008
Publication date
01-2019
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Political economy
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
,
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/the-dark-side-of-the-vote(07c75e61-b62f-4f65-9cdb-ed848c9b13f5).html