Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines

Author(s)
Emin Karagözoğlu, Martin G. Kocher
Abstract

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.

Organisation(s)
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
Journal
Experimental Economics
Volume
22
Pages
419–440
ISSN
1386-4157
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9579-y
Publication date
06-2018
Publication status
E-pub ahead of print
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502045 Behavioural economics, 502021 Microeconomics
Keywords
Bargaining, Deadline effect, Disagreements
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/bargaining-under-time-pressure-from-deadlines(3c49730f-f4f9-4694-b0a8-bd3442ee01da).html