Corporate Governance and Neoclassical Economics

Author(s)
Dennis C. Mueller
Abstract

Although the term “corporate governance” is relatively new in the economist’s lexicon, the issues with which it is concerned are as old as the profession itself. In this article, first I try to illustrate this, and then I trace the development of the literature, including discussions of the so-called managerial discretion literature and the principal–agent literature. Following a discussion of asset bubbles, I illustrate the tension between concerns about corporate governance and neoclassical economics by examining the literature on managerial compensation and mergers. This literature reveals a wide gap between traditional neoclassical economics and more recent developments in behavioral economics.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
Journal
International Journal of the Economics of Business
Volume
25
Pages
47-64
No. of pages
18
ISSN
1357-1516
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2017.1374038
Publication date
01-2018
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Economic theory
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
,
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/corporate-governance-and-neoclassical-economics(4eb27e03-7ffe-48bf-becd-39e357c84098).html