A comparative welfare analysis of electoral systems with endogenous turnout

Author(s)
Melis Kartal
Abstract

I investigate the welfare properties of a broad class of electoral systems with endogenous turnout. I find that the welfare ranking of electoral systems depends on the composition of the electorate. If citizens have identical voting costs, then all electoral systems that satisfy certain regularity properties generate the same level of welfare. If voting costs are heterogeneous, and the two parties are (almost) equally popular, then majority rule (MR) generates the highest welfare among these systems. I also analyse a model with heterogeneous and group-specific costs. I show that, under certain conditions, proportional representation dominates MR.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
Journal
The Economic Journal
Volume
125
Pages
1369 - 1392
No. of pages
24
ISSN
0013-0133
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12150
Publication date
08-2014
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Economic theory
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/a-comparative-welfare-analysis-of-electoral-systems-with-endogenous-turnout(86a01f59-d970-444d-9c23-39ed98f4e92f).html