Social Preferences and Self-Control

Author(s)
Alexander K. Wagner, Anja Achtziger, Carlos Alos-Ferrer
Abstract

We provide new evidence on the impact of diminished self-control on social preferences in the ultimatum game. In a sample of German university students (N=312), depleted proposers made lower offers, and depleted responders rejected unfair offers as often as non-depleted ones. This agrees with previous evidence on the Dictator Game but stands in contrast with a previous study with a sample of Spanish university students. A possible explanation is that selfish motives are the default mode of behavior, but there is individual heterogeneity on whether strategic fairness (fear of rejection) can overcome them.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
External organisation(s)
Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Universität Zürich (UZH), Zeppelin Universität
Journal
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume
74
Pages
161-166
ISSN
2214-8043
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.009
Publication date
06-2018
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
Behavioural economics
Keywords
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/social-preferences-and-selfcontrol(a0ef9f3b-4891-4331-858c-a61d1bb84736).html