Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy
- Author(s)
- Rupert Sausgruber, Axel Sonntag, Jean-Robert Tyran
- Abstract
We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a "dividend of democracy" in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
- Organisation(s)
- Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics
- External organisation(s)
- Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU), IHS - Institut für Höhere Studien und wissenschaftliche Forschung
- Publication date
- 2019
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502057 Experimental economics, 502045 Behavioural economics
- Keywords
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/98df3ba4-4d20-4197-b551-c7e14ae34430