Rent Sharing and Gender Discrimination

Author(s)
Christine Zulehner, Mario Lackner
Abstract

Objective In this article, we analyze whether firms with market power-measured by their market share-fill top management positions differently than firms with no market power. Market power gives firms the opportunity to share rents with their employees. If these firms or their owners also have a taste for discrimination, they may share their rents in a discriminatory way. Using data from top-level collegiate athletics, we assess the effect of market power-measured by market share-on the relative employment and wages of female coaches. Methods To account for the potential endogeneity of market power and unobserved productivity of female coaches, we exploit the effect of an institutionalized cartel, that is, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), on a college's athletic department market share. By exploiting particular organizational characteristics of the BCS as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal link between market power and female employment. Results Our results show that an increase in the market share has a negative effect on females relative to males among coaches. Conclusion We interpret this as evidence for Becker's (1957) theory on employer discrimination.

Organisation(s)
Department of Economics
External organisation(s)
Johannes Kepler Universität Linz
Journal
Social Sciences Quarterly
Volume
101
Pages
678-696
No. of pages
19
ISSN
0038-4941
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12765
Publication date
2019
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502047 Economic theory
Keywords
Sustainable Development Goals
SDG 5 - Gender Equality
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/rent-sharing-and-gender-discrimination(2e894004-6749-4b5a-8102-449e06d13a90).html