The value of confidential policy information: Persuasion, transparency, and influence
- Author(s)
- Clement Minaudier
- Abstract
Transparency of the lobbying process is hailed as an effective means to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers (PMs)? This article extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of PMs to obtain information before interacting with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. It shows that, counter-intuitively, the influence of special interest groups can increase as PMs become more expert. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, good governance, and influence.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Economics
- Journal
- The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
- Volume
- 38
- Pages
- 570-612
- No. of pages
- 43
- ISSN
- 8756-6222
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab020
- Publication date
- 12-2021
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 502047 Economic theory, 502027 Political economy
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics, Law, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/the-value-of-confidential-policy-information-persuasion-transparency-and-influence(7bd5e5d3-fd24-45a5-8aa7-1a580c229ef7).html